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Hidden  and suppressed  inflation  in Czechoslovakia  in 1985-91
-reflected  in long  waiting  lists  forcars  and  state  and  cooperative
flats - was relatively  slight  for the economy  as a whole, and it
virtually  disappeared  when  prices  rose after  prices  liberalized  in
1990-91.
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Drabek,  Janacek,  and Tuma assess inflation  in  For Czechoslovakia,  the official  price
Czechoslovakia  between 1985  and 1991  and  indices  show virtually  no inflation  between 1985
identify  the main causes of inflation  through  a  and 1989,  when  there were  long waiting  lists for
literue  survey  and empirical  studies.  such products  as cars and state and cooperative
flats. Trends  in these price indices  do not seem to
The official  puices  in centrally  planned  depend  on the method  used for constructing
economies  were never  perceived  by central  them, according  to the sensitivity  tests conducted
planners  to be fully  market clearing.  Only  by  by Czechoslovakia's  Federal Statistical  Office.
coin'idence would the overall  price level  Obviously,  the official  price indices failed  to
correspond  to the level associated  with general  capture  the full extent  of economic
equilibrium.  disequilibrium  in that period.
What is missing in official  price indices  in  But the extent to which  official  price indices
centrally  planned  economies-including  the  understated  inflationary  pressures  was  not
consumer  price index  - is "suppressed"  serious  in Czechoslovakia,  compared  with other
inflation,  manifest  in queuing  for products,  centrally  planned  economies.  Estimates  of
forced  substitution  of demand,  and forced  hidden  inflation  for 1985-89  range  from 0.5
savings.  Also  missing is "hidden"  inflation,  percent to 2 percent a year  in consumer  maikets
associated  with practices  that disguise  price  and about  3 percent in the industrial  sector.
increases  behind  "cosmetic"  or other  changes  in  Estimates  for suppressed  inflation  were  less than
product  quality.  5 percent.  The relatively  small inflationary  gap is
Indirectly  confimned  by the shaip inflation
Drabek, Janacek,  and Tuma argue  that  associated  with the recent price liberalization
inflationary  pressures  in Czechoslovakia  in  that subsided  in a relatively  short  period, and
1985-89  originated  mainly  in the investment  both suppressed  and hidden  inflations  have
sector.  Even though  the investment  sector  was  virtually  disappeared.
stricty controlled,  making  it difficult  for open
inflation  to emerge,  the scope for inflationary  Estimates  of hidden  inflation  were based on
pressures  was great in Czechoslovakia.  Such  benchmark  price comparisons  between
pressures  arose from a mixture  of factors,  Czechoslovakia  and such market economies  as
including  poor investment  planning,  Austria.  Tlose for suppressed  inflation  were
accommodating  govemment  finance,  and the  based on disequilibrium  econometric  models  of
high priority  given to investments  and social  asset holdings  and on "conjecture  tests."
consumption.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates e findings  of work  umder  way i tde  Bank.  .n  objetive of the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly.  even if presentations  are less than fully polishec'.  The fmdings. interpretations,  end
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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The paper assesses the extent of inflation in Czechoslovakia  during the period 1985-91
and identifies the main causes of inflation, based on a literature survey and some empirical
studies.
The official prices in centrally planned economies (CPEs) were never perceived by
central planners to be fully market-clearing, and the overall price  level would, therefore,
correspond to the level associated  with the general equilibrium  only by coincidence. What is
missing in  CPEs'  official price  indices including the  consumer price  index (CPI) is  the
"suppressed" inflation, which is  manifested in  queuing for products, forced substitution of
demand  and forced savings. Also missing  is the "hidden"  inflation, which is associated  with dhe
practices that disguise price increases behind "cosmetic"  or other changes in product quality.
The paper argues that inflationary  pressures in Czechoslovakia  in the period 1985-89
originated mainly in the investment sector.  Even though the investment sector was strictly
controlled  and the emergence  of open inflation  was extremely  difficult, the scope for inflationary
pressures was wide in Czechoslovakia. The pressures arose from a mixture of factors - high
priority given to  investments and  social consumption, poor investment planning, and the
accommodating  government finance.
In Czechoslovakia,  the official  price indices  show  virtually  no inflation  between 1985  and
1989  when there were long waiting  lists for such  products as cars and state and cooperative  flats.
Trends in these price indices do not seem to depend on the methodology  used for constructing
them,  according to  the  sensitivity tests  conducted by  the  Federal  Statistical Office of
Czechoslovakia. Obviously, the official price indices of Czechoslovakia  failed to capture the
ful  extent of economic  disequilibrium  during that period.
The paper finds, however, that the extent of understatement  by the official price indices
of inflationary pressures was not serious, especially compared to other CPEs.  Estimates of
hidden inflation  for 1985-89  range from 0.5 percent to 2 percent per year in consumer markets
and about 3 percent in the industrial sector.  Those for suppressed inflation were less than 5
percent. The relatively small inflationary  gap is indirectly  confirmed  by the fact that the sharp
inflation associated with the recent price liberalization has subsided over a relatively short
period.
The paper discusses the methods used for the estimates of  hidden and suppressed
inflation.  It indicates that estimates of the hidden inflation were based on benchmark price
comparisons  between Czechoslovakia  and market economies  such as Austria, and those for the
suppressed inflation, based on  disequilibrium econometric models on  asset holdings and
"conjuncture  tests."
Finally, the paper discusses  the 1990-91  price liberalization  and the associated  price rises,
showing that both suppressed  and hidden inflation  have virtually disappeared  now.INLATION  IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1985-1991'
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to  assess inflation in  Czechoslovakia  in  the period of
1985-1991  and to identify its causes. We shall show that the period has been characterized by
inflationary  pressures, which were translated  partly into open inflation and partly into suppressed
and hidden inflation until full price liberalization  was introduced in January 1991. Since then,
inflationary  pressures have been fully channeled  into open inflation.
Inflation measurement  is dependent  on availability  and reliability  of data. The expertise
of Czechoslovak statisticians and statistical offices is reasonable. Czechoslovak  price data,
however, are problematic, difficult to interpret and not available for certain specific  uses.
While the measurement  problems  are generally  known, the way in which Czechoslovak
economists  and statisticians  have addressed  these  questions  is less familiar. The literature  is quite
plentiful  but most, if not all, has been written in Czech  or Slovak. In addition,  a large number
of these studies have appeared in semi-official  publications,  so that they have not been easily
accessible. Given the wealth  of material  and economic  talent, the lack of information  about the
Czechoslovak  literature has been a  disappointing  gap in  understanding economic issues of
Central  Europe. The paper draws conclusions  from a survey  of relevant  Czechoslovak  literature
and authors' analyses of limitedly available data.
The period 1990-1991 is analyzed separately  in  this study. The main reason is the
economic reform that followed political changes in November 1989 and led to partial price
liberalization  in  1990 and full price liberalization  in 1991. As a result, inflationary  pressures
were released much more intensively through open inflation in  1990 and fully in 1991. The
increase in price levels in 1990 and 1991 represents  partly the size of the monetary overhang
accumulated  by the end of 1989. Of course, inflation  in these two years was fed through  other
channels as  well,  as  we  shall  argue  in  the  text.  Nevertheless, the  highly restrictive
macroeconomic  policy, which accompanied  e  reform, was instrumental in minimizing the
importance  of these channels.
'We would like to thank Mr. I. Sujan  and Mrs. Kocianova (Federal Statistical  Office), and
and Mr. E. Sip (Federal Ministry of Finance)  for their assistance  in providing  data and helpful
suggestions.  Thanks are also due to Richard  Porter, John  Flemming,  Jong-Goo  Park, participants
of The World Bank workshop  and the anonymous  reviewer  for the helpful  comments  on the first
draft of the paper.  The usual disclaimer holds - none of these persons is responsible for any
shortcomings  which may still remain and the views expressed in the paper do not represent the
views of the World Bank or its member  countries.The paper consists  of four main parts. Sec-tion  I discusses  Czechoslovakia's  inflation
during  1985-89,  including  types  of inflation  and their nature  and causes.  Section  2 is devoted
to inflation  indicators,  starting  with official  indices  and continuing  with various  indicators  of
disequilibria.  In Section  3, we review the recent period, 1990-1991,  and discuss  the role of
inflation  during  the transition  process.  Our conclusions  are presented  in Section  4.
21.  Inflation in 1985-1989
1.1  "Types"  of Inflation
As numerous Czechoslovak  studies show, inflationary  parameters were "built in" and
they were a  generic feature of the tradidonal centrally planned economy. They manifested
themselves  as a continuous  aggregate  demand  overhang, as a gap between  demand  for economic
resources on the part of economic  subjects, and the available  disposable  resources. 2
In  addition  to  systemic  causes,  two  -ther  factors  contributed to  inflation  in
Czechoslovakia:  the type of economic  policy and external causes (such as rising import p.ices
and other external shocks).  All the inflationary  factors may  have intertwined  but systemic  causes
were decisive for inflationary  trends in Czechoslovakia  in the period analyzed  here, i.e.,  in the
second half of the 1980s.
As  shown in  Section 2,  all  three types of inflation coexisted in  the Czechoslovak
economy: first,  there was open inflation, seen  in  the growth of  consumer prices (in the
Consumer  Price Index, CPI). The price level increased  as a result of autonomous  pressures, such
as the existence  of persistent excess demand  in dile  (partial)  consumer goods market, which had
to be accommodated  by decisions  of central authorities  to raise prices. But this was only one of
several ways in which disequilibrium  demonstrated  itself in a centrally planned economy.
The second type of macroeconomic  disequilibrium  was suppressed  inflation. Rigidity  of
prices,  exchange rates,  wages, and interest rates meant that prices in  markets for goods,
services, foreign currency and labor did not usually balance supply and demand; this resulted
in demand overhang  for goods and services on the one hand and excess money holdings  on the
other. Together with administrative  allocations of inputs, price rigidity was another important
factor that brought about a highly inelastic supply  response. The demand overhang  also resulted
in searches for goods in  short supply, "forced" substitution  and "forced" savings, queuing,
rationing systems, waiting lists, and other alternative mechanisms of  allocation. Typical in
Czechoslovakia  were waiting lists for state and cooperative  flats, and, at the end of the 1980s,
for cars. In that case, disequilibriur was not accompanied  by a corresponding  increase  in prices
2Ir the view of most Czechoslovak  economists, the primary cause of disequilibrium  at the
macroeconomic  level lies in a centrally planned economy on the demand side.  The principal
role of demand inflation, however, does not mean that cost inflation  plays no role, and that there
is no feedback between cost and demand inflation.  The enduring demand overhang in the
investment  sector, and in some  parts of the sector of materials  and intermediary  products, creates
a favorable  climate  for cost-push  inflation. However, the transmission  mechanism  of inflationary
pressures was not the same as in market economics  and has not been fully understood.
3for apartments and cars. Nevertheless,  the general shortages have been accompanied  by high
costs in searching  for goods, as reflected  in the value of time lost in queuing, hunting for goods,
and other makeshift solutions.3
The third type of inflation  was hidde  inflation. Growth  of some  prices was not reflected
in the official  price indexes  (mainly,  this was true for prices of investment  goods, but it was also
seen in the form of the so-called "product quality upgrading"). Also, there were hidden  price
increases. As the quality of an item went down without a corresponding  drop in price, ceteris
pAribis, its implicit price increased (due to quality deterioration), although the explicit price
remained  unchanged.  This downward  price rigiditq represented,  in fact, an inflationary  pressure.
Pai  passu, the official price index covered only part of the movement in price level. The
implicit price increase, as well as that part of the explicit price increase which reflected the
"product-quality  upgrading"  noted above, were not iicluded. All this has led to various attempts
to measure suppressed  and hidden  inflation (see Section 2) in order to get a "true" measure of
inflation.
1.2  An International Comparison
We strongly believe that in  Czechoslovakia, hidden and suppressed inflation were
significantly  lower than in Poland and Hungary (see, for instance, Portes (1977]). This can be
explained  by several factors. First, Czechoslovakia  had already established a tradition of tight
monetary discipline in the inter-war period. This tradition continued in the centrally-planned
period. 4 The tight financial policy has been demonstrated, for example, during the  whole
post-war  period, including  the 1980s,  by strict wage  policy reflected  in a relatively tight control
of wages and other incomes. This can be documented  by the relative success in keeping the
growth rate of wages below that of labor productivity, calculated  here as changes in output in
constant  prices for labor input. In 1985, the ratio of growth of wages to growth of productivity
was only 0.51; i.e.,  for every increase of labor productivity  by 1 percent, wages increased by
0.51 percent. The corresponding figures for  1986 and  1987 were 0.44  and 0.76 percent,
respectively.  The loosening  of central control in 1988 and 1989 resulted in convergence  of the
two growth rates; the ratios were 1.00 for 1988, and 0.99 for 1989.  Even in these years,
however, the growth of wages did not exceed the rate of labor productivity  growth, thanks to
a mix of direct and indirect controls over the growth of incomes.
Income transfers from abroad could potentially  be another source of demand inflation.
They played a relatively important  part in the " dollarization"  of the Polish economy, but they
3  These additional  costs represented, of course, a shift towards  a lower order of consumer
utility.
I  The monetary policy of  the inter-war period is well described in Kaser and Radice
[1985].  The monetary policy under central planning  is reviewed in Garvy [1977].
4have been less significant  in Czechoslovakia.  The inflationary  nature of income transfers from
abroad in Poland came from uncontrolled  inflow of foreign currency, which was not sterilized
by monetary authorities. This was partly due to the fact that a large part of these transfers took
place outside the banking scltor. Moreover, even when the funds were channeled through the
banking sector, the control over money stock was limited due to difficulties  in controlling  bank
lending. Throughout the 1980s, income transfers represented  about 3 percent of total incomes
and their share was kept relatively stable. In addition, the  so-called "dollarization" of the
economy  was only marginal in Czechoslovakia  compared with Poland.
Also, the long-term  policy of equilibrium  in the balance of payments (with both deficits
and surpluses  kept .ow) did not bring any significant  inflationary  pressures into the economy.
It is well known  that balance  of payments  disequilibria  could be a major source of inflation. The
transmission  mechanisms  have been explained  in a model based on a stylized  centrally  planned
economy in Drabek (1985) and Wolf (1978) and with specific  applications  to the economy of
the former Soviet Union  by Treml for the US Department  of Labor in m.;d-1980s.  Hence, again
the basic idea was the inability, and some unwillingness,  of monetary authorities  to "mop up"
excess  liquidity  stemming  from balance  of payments  surpluses  in domestic  currency  or to restrain
the policy-induced  growth of money supply following  the outflow of currency in the case of
balance of payment deficits.
The conduct of monetary  policies  was, we believe, also relatively effective.  Even though
the role of mnoney  was limited as in other centrally  planned economies,  the monetary  authorities
were very conscious  of and followed very closely, movements  of monetary
aggregates. Moreover, a conscious  effort was made to regulate the growth of money supply. In
the course of the second half of the 1980s, for example, it was recommended  that the growth
of money  supply be linked  to the growth of real gross national  income with the aim of limiting
the inflationary  impact  of rapid growth of money supply  (see Kocarnik  [1987J).  Policies toward
deposit interest rates were relatively  flexible, and the authorities  took concrete steps to mop up
liquidity from the savings banks.
To repeat, the outcome of such policies in Czechoslovakia  was that the inflationary
pressures (channeled  through  all three types of inflation)  were lower during the 1980s  than, for
instance,  in Poland and Hungary. This also had important  consequences  for the price adjustment
that occurred in these three countries after the liberalization  of prices (see section 3).
Analysis of the causes of inflation in Czechoslovakia,  and the paths through which it
spread, reveals the importance of different "segments" within the economy, and of specific
mechanisms of inflation spillover among the segments. The existence of discrete segments
originated in the differences  in the decision-making  processes. It was also caused by differing
degrees of monetization  within the economy - by a de facto coexistence  of various "types of
money" in the total money  supply. As a result, the inflationary  process and its time horizon can
be divided into two separate components  - consumer goods and investment  goods sectors.
51.L Investment-Induced .flation
The  centrally-planned economy created a  "soft,"  non-parametric environment for
government  and enterprise decision-making  in production and investment.  For Czechoslovakia,
analyses conclude that investment was the main cause and generating force of inflation over
time. Inflation was tied both  to the level of investment and to its structure, varying with
particular sectors and industries. The close tie between investment  and inflation arose primarily
from the absence - both at the macro-  and 'nicroeconomic  levels - of effective  economic  criteria
and/or limits on efficient allocation of investment. Clearly, these inefficiencies had to be
accommodated  by monetary  policies.
The origins of this argument  go back to the work of a leading Czechoslovak  economist
Josef Goldmann, who elaborated in the 1960s a model of investment-induced  business cycles
under socia.sm.  In brief, his analysis was as follows: At the beginning of every five-year
planning cycle, the  tendency was great  to  increase the investment ratio and to  start new
investment projects. This was caused by the well known "investment  hunger" of enterprises,
which was financed through  the central budget and monetized.  In:  the third year of the planning
period, this investment  wave usually  encountered  constraints in the capacity of the investment
producing sector. The result was delays in investment  completion,  cancellations  of projects and
a  need to adapt the volume of  investment to the limits of  capacity. Delays in investment
completion  had an inflationary  impact  due to the failure to meet  planned output increases, which
subsequently  caused an increase in money supply. In Czechoslovakia  in the 1950s  and 1960s,
three such investment waves were documented; the third even led to a collapse of the third
five-year  plan in 1963 (See Goldmann  - Kouba [1967].)
In contrast to the traditional  arguments about disequilibrium  in the CPE, Goldmann  and
Kouba and  their followers identified two sources of inflation - the  consumer goods and
investment goods  markets. In  the  consumer goods  market, inflationary pressures  were
transmitted  in two ways. In general, equilibrium  in the consumer  goods market was influenced
by the success of central regulation of wages and prices; by production capacities  and growth
of productivity  in the consumer goods, food and service industries; by flexibility  of producers
in these industries  and by the ability of the economy to produce export goods convertible  into
sufficient  imports of consumer  products. As is already well known  from the general literature,
the wage  regulations  were not foolproof,  and the supply  of consumer  goods was not able to avert
inflation.
1.4  Inflationary Expectations
The other transmission mechanism for inflationary pressures in the consumer goods
markets was the spillover  effect of inflationary  pressures  from the investment  goods market. The
5  The Czechoslovak  authorities  were reluctant  to borrow  to finance  current account  deficits.
The value of deficits was, therefore, heavily depe:idant  on export competitiveness.
6argument  was based on tbe role ol expectations.  In a general inflationary  climate, other
economic  entities  (households,  enterprises  and the government)  were  inot  just passive  takers  of
inflation  even under central planning.  In their behavior,  they anticipated  some degree of
inflation,  and these  inflationary  expectations  were  translated  into  the construction  of plan targets
and household  decisions.  This  could  contribute  to -additional  inflationary  pressures.  In a market
economy,  price increases  in the investment  sector,  for example,  had a double  impact:  demand
(income)  effect  for  the initiators  of the price  increase  and cost  effect  for the buyers  of investment
goods.  Both the income  and the cost effects  fed further  inflation.  Thr)ugh the cost increase,
inflation  was  spread  to final  production.  Even  though  they  did not spell  out their  theory  in detail,
several  Czechoslovak  economists  believed  that the transmission  mechanism  was  very similar  to
the one operating  in a market  economy  as discussed  above,  although  not as straightforward  6
1.5  Monetization  of Inbalances
The crucial  question  is why underfulfillment  plan targets  were monetized.  According  to
many  observers,  one answer  is the chronic  imbalances  between  aggregate  spending  and overall
resource  mobilization,  which  originated  in an excessive  demands  for  resources  (i.e., plan  targets
of  aggregate spending), underfulfillment  of  investment output targets combined with
unsatisfactorl supply of  consumer goods. This disequilibrium,  wh.4.  was permanently
monetized,  was induced  by inconsistences  in the principal  goals  of the economic  system. 7 On
the one hand, definite social-economic  goals were postulated  concerning  the character of
consumption  (ample "social incemes", high share of  "social funds" in financing  public
consumption,  sow  rents in housing,  low  prices  of services,  equalization  of incomes)  - all this to
be realized  mainly  through  the state  budget.  On the other  hand,  no corresponding  measures  were
taken  on the supply  side  iri  -roduction  and imports  of consumer  goods  (in the second  half  of the
1980s,  for example,  the share  of imported  consumer  goods  never exceeded  11 percent  of the
retail turnover).
At the same  time, the planners  favored  the growth  of investment-intensive  industries.
One implication  of this preference  was the investment  share  in national  income  was high and
rigid.  Combined  with  the high  share  of social  consumption  in total  aggregate  spending,  this  made
real  aggregate  spending  difficult  to adjust  downward.  Another  implication  was  to give  preference
to producer-goods  industries  rather than industries  producing  for final consumption  whenever
there were  competing  claims  on resources  at the margin.
This imbalance  did not  appear  on the level  of plan  construction,  but it emerged  once  the
targets  were implemented.  Of course,  the government  tried to balance  the growth  of incomes
with the capacity  of the economy  to supply  consumer  goods and services. But periodical
6For  further  details, see Kupka  [1983].
7Another  reason  was mistakes  in plan construction,  but these  tended  to be random,  i.e.,
without  a specific  bias in planning  the overall  macrobalance.
7over-investment,  resulting from unplanned-delays  in completion  of new capacities and poor
return on investments,  precluded  the planned contribution  of investment  to output and income.
As a result, some or all wage payments could not be financed from revenues of suppliers of
investment  goods. This called for additional  assistance to be provided to the investment  gnods
sector in the form of income or price subsidies,  subsidized  credit, or permission to  pries.  The
lack of wage adjustment, combined with budgetary transfeis, created additional pressures to
balance the budget - by offsetting the additional budgetary expenditures with Central bank
financing, by upward price adjustment  or additional taxatior (profit deductions). 8 The two of
these  instruments of  financing were  directly inflationary, while  taxation was  indirectly
inflationary  because it reduced the net profitability of enterprises and hence their incentive to
supply  goods and/or induced them to their prices. 9
The transmission  mechanism  described  above  is what many  economists  in Czechoslovakia
meant when they argued that wages in the investment sector had no adequate counterpart in
consumer  goods. Some economists  have even argued that the multiplier  effect of investment  on
wages could disrupt the original  intentions  of planners. They argued that the central plan usually
took into account this multiplier effect only partially, reflecting only its first round. Secondary
and further multiplier  effects were not respected  ex an  by the plan. As soon as the multiplier
effect  of investment  began to affect consumer  incomes,  there were attempts to check it by further
balances. This situation has been called "permanent  planning'  - meaning, in fact, that real
economic  trends were ex  t  implanted  into the plan.  10
1.6  Monopolistic Structure
The lack of control over enterprises in the producer price sector was also related to a
specific  industrial structure. In Czechoslovakia,  many enterprises were monopolistic  producers
of some goods. These enterprises strived (mostly  with success)  not only to pass the increases in
prices of inputs onto their output prices; they also endeavored  to take advantage  of inflation by
additionally increasing prices and by demanding subsidies or  tax relief. Thanks to  lack of
competition  from abroad, this behavior was feasible.
8Theoretically,  the  Government could use two additional sources of  financing - bank
borrowing and external borrowing. The effect of bank borrowing  on domestic  price level could
have been the same as the effect of Central Bank financing of the budget deficit.  The reason
was that the banking system was simply  and extension  of the budget with limited scope for its
own resource mobilization.  External borrowing was not significant because of govemment
policy to restrict it.
9This, of course, does not mean that enterprises were free to set their prices or that they
were profit maximizers. However, the link between  profits and labor input was strong enough
to affect variations in the level and structure  of output.
'°See Janacek et al. [1970].
8The planners were tried through economic policy and central planning to prevent the
transmission  of inflation from the investment  sector to the consumer market, as well as to put
an end to the origin of inflationary  pressures. Politically, this was not always possible in view
of the close links between enterprise managers  and the Party. Nevertheless,  thanks to measures
mentioned above (control of  money supply, income and wage regulation), planners partly
succeeded. As shown in Section 2,  there was a difference between suppressed and hidden
inflation in the investment  sector (estimated  at roughly 5 percent annually  in the 1980s)  and in
the consumer market (2 percent annually)."
2.  Inflation Estimators
2.1  Official Indices
Changes in  the price level are typically measured by  consumer price index (CPI),
producer price index (PPI) and GNP (GDP) deflator. The first two indices are published in
Czechoslovakia  by the Federal Statistical  Office (FSO), whereas  GNP deflator  was not available
in the past because the GNP has not been computed  until recently. However, by comparing  net
material product (NMP) - an alternative indicator used by central planners - in current and
constant prices, one can compute an NMP deflator. CPI remains most popular, because it
reflects the impact of prices, on the standard of living. (All available indices from 1980 are
shown in Tables I and It in the appendix.)
CPI was computed as "full"-- that is to say it covered all retail sales, and weights were
taken (until 1991)  from expenditures  in retail trade. The methodology  has been changed  recently,
due to the discontinuation  of data on retail expenditures.  The weights  are estimated  from "family
surveys."I 2 The problem of weights is clearly most important because the use of Laspeyers
index leads to comparing  aggregates  with different weights. In the past the weights have been
regularly changed, typically once every five years. Tne current weights use 1989 as the base
year and will be kept until  1993. The FSO carries out a  sensitivity test each quarter by
recalculating  the Laspeyers  indices  with Paasche  indices  to assess  the importance  of weights. The
most recent test at FSO showed  that the differences  between both series are rather small and the
Paasche index is slightly lower, with differences  ranging from 1 to 3 points. However, it must
11 The differont rates of inflation in these two sectors could also reflect different rates of
productivity growth.  In brief, the inflation pattem was most likely determined both by the
effects of policy and by different growth rates of productivity. It should also be kept in mind
that there were always some "markets"  for stocks  of unsalable  products, and that some  capacities
were not always fully underutilized. This was particularly the case of the intermediary  sector,
in which a simultaneous  presences of shortages  and excessive stocks could be often observed.
12The surveys provide cross-section  data and are based on the family budget data; the size
of the sample is 5,500 households.
9be kept in mind that Paasche methodology  tends to lower the value of the calculated index in
"normal" market situations" because of the way in which the weights are used.  Paasche index
uses current-year  weights. The sample  used by FSO covered 1,065 items until the end of 1991,
but it was reduced to 823 items on Jan. 1, 1992. This reduction was not only possible but also
necessary.  On  the  one  hand,  data  have  not  been easily available, due  mainly to  the
decentralization  and privatization  of retail sector. That has meant that it is now much more
difficult to monitor the retail sector in such detail as was true under central planning.  On the
other hand, the experience from Western economies  shows that smaller samples are sufficient.
According to the official  estimates  of CPI and PPI, there was virtually no open inflation
between 1985  and 1989. Table  I suggests  that inflation  hardly increased  between 1986  and 1989
after peaking in  1985 at 2.7 percent annually. The inflation  picked up in 1990 (10.0 percent)
when the first price liberalization  steps were taken and it accelerated to almost 58 percent in
1991, when full price liberalization  was implemented. The story is virtually the same for all
groups of consumer purchases.
The picture is similar when we assess the movement of  PPI. Producer prices were
characterized  by relative  stability  between 1985  and 1989, except for a decline  in 1989  according
to the official sources.  But they increased considerably  in 1990, and dramatically  in 1991.
The official CPI does not reflect the "true" inflation for several reasons. As described
above, centrally  planned  economies  exhibit  hidden  and suppressed  inflation  which. by definition,
are not included in  the official index. Remember, hidden inflation is an adjustment going
"outside" the official index. It refers either to explicit price changes that do not enter into the
official  CPI, or implicit  price changes  that occur when the price level is seemingly  the same but
quality of  goods is  worse at that same price.  Suppressed inflation is  a  state of  internal
macroeconomic  disequilibrium  in which aggregate  domestic  demand  exceeds aggregate  domestic
supply without simultaneous  price adjustment.
There have been other attempts in  Czechoslovakia  to  tackle hidden and suppressed
inflation  empirically. These can be divided into two groups. The first includes studies based on
the influential  approach derived from disequilibrium  theory and modelling.  The second group
includes a wide range of "ad hoc" indicators that are often treated as proxies for hidden and
suppressed inflation. The most frequently  used are estimates  based on the purchasing power
parity  (PPP)  theory,  various  derivatives  of  sa Zings, black  exchange  rates,  specific
survey-oriented  methods, and macroindices  of shortages. All these studies have been subject to
considerable  controversy and discussion in the country, similar to parallel discussions abroad.
"It is normally assumed  that faster growth of volumes is associated  with slower growth of
prices for particular commodities  and vice versa.  The Paasche index gives higher weight to
slowly  increasing  prices, which tends to lower aggregate  prices increase  over time. There is no
a priori reason to believe that the pattern of price-volume changes was different in centrally
planned economies.
10The outcome of local discussion is not entirely conclusive  even though most writers agree on
several important points, as we shall see below. We shall start with estimates based on the
disequilibrium  theory.
2.2  Disequilibrium Theory and InMlation
The disequilibrium  approach, originally  pioneered by R. Barro and H. Grossman  in the
early 1970s (Barro-Grossman  [1971, 1974, 1976]), was first applied in modelling  CPEs by R.
Portes,  see  e.g.  Portes  and  Winter  [1980],  and  later  developed by  many  others.  In
Czechoslovakia  the most important  followers were Dlouhy or Dlouhy and Dyba (1985)  and V.
Rudlovcak (1987, 1988).
All applications,  either related to the consumer  market only (Dlouhy [1989], Rudlovcak
(1988]) or  covering the  linkage between consumer and  labor  ;..arkets" 4 (Dlouhy (1984),
Dlouhy-Dyba  (1985)), are open to the standard criticism  of disequilibrium  modelling  (see, for
instance, Komai (1980)  or Winiecki  (1985). Not even later developments  incorporating  rational
expectations  and plan data"' changed the fundamentals  of the approach. The major concern of
critics is with the "min-condition"  which states that there cannot be excess supply and excess
demand in the market at the same time. The simplest disequilibrium  model  looks like this:
(1)  Qd  =aX  +e,
(2)  Qt5= b Y,  + de
(3)  Qt = mm(n  d,  O)
where Qd,  Q' represent demand and supply, respectively;  a, b are row vectors of parameters;
X and Y are column vectors of explanatory  variables to be explained  further in the text below;
e, d are random terms; and Q is an actual size of transactions. Subscript  t refers to time period.
It is obvious that this is a highly simplified  model  of macroeconomic  disequilibrium. The min-
condition equation  does not capture simultaneous  disequilibria  in individual  markets. Nor does
it capture the spillovers from a particular market to others.  These issues have been amply
discussed in  the literature - for example in the analysis of  the 'aggregation problem'.  In
addition, the model refers to the goods market only, with no attempt to integrate it with labor
1"This  linkage is ideologically  based on the supply multiplier  developed  by Barro Grossman
(1974).  An alternative approach has recently been proposed by Feltenstein and Ha (1992).
Their model tests for suppressed  inflation  by estimating a "true" rate of inflation that explains
behavior of observed money demand.
"In Czechoslovak  literature, the plan data were used by Rudlovcak (1987).
11or  other markets.  Further, it deals with the consumer market only and does not include
investment  and intermediate  products markets. But as we have shown above, the latter markets
are often in disequilibria  in CPEs.
Due to space limitations, the following discussion  refers only to most recent estimates
(Rudlovcak [1987, 1988]; Diouhy [1989]).  Both writers found that there had not been any
systematic  excess demand in the Czechoslovak  consumer market in the periods they studied,
1960-1984  and 1975 -1988, respectively. Even though consistent  with the official data noted
above and intuitively appealing, the findings contradict other indicators, such as "conjuncture
tests" and derivatives  of savings, which  reveal permanent,  though not substantial,  disequilibrium
in the consumer market.  These methods are discussed  in the next section." 6
Both Rudlovcak [1987, 1988] and Dlouhy [1989] used Houthakker-Taylor  demand
function that had been previously  applied to Czechoslovak  savings  data by Klaus and Rudlovcak
[1977].  The demand function was not a source of differences  among  various estimates  within
the disequilibrium  framework; it was typically based on household  incomes and their savings.
Major disputes  were concerned  principally  with specifications  of the supply  function. Rudlovcak
incorporated into the  specification  of  the supply function the household total income and
expenditures, which were specified  in the government  plan, and a proxy variable to reflect the
state of equilibrium  in the market and the likely response  of the planning  center. Dlouhy [19891
- reestimating the  Portes-Winter model - used  their  original specification based  on  the
assumption that the  planning center  responds mainly to  fluctuations in  gross agriculture
production and household money balances.' 7 As noted above, both Dlouhy and Rudlovcak
found that there were regimes of excess demand  as well as of excess supply. The problem is that
periods which were considered  by most observers to be years of large shortages, such as years
1969, 1974, and 1978, were modelled as periods with excess supply. The interpretation is,
therefore, very difficult and one must use their results with caution. In contrast, the estimates
16Strictly speaking, the  findings are  not  contradictory if  the  findings based  on  the
disequilibrium  model  are interpreted  as flows while the findings  based  on 'conjuncture tests" and
on savings  derivatives  as stocks. The latter - implying  the presence  of rationing  systems - could
indeed be a permanent  feature in markets with no clear trend of suppressed  inflation  as defined
in the text above.
17Dlouhy also reestimated the Burkett model in which he tried to take into account the
reservations to the min-condition  noted above. Burkett's modified  model  assumes that the min-
condition holds at micro-level  and that the aggregation  comes afterwards. The impact  on results
is not substantial.
12for the 1980s were more robust, and confirmed  the general perceptions  about permanent  excess
demand in the 1980s.18
While they provide a useful tool for modeling  and, therefore, understanding  the CPEs,
it  is quite evident that the studies based on  the disequiliburum  framework have remained
controversial. In particular, the empirical tests of the disequilibrium theory have not led to
unambiguous  and robust  results  and the theoretical  underpinnings  also have  been contested. Fine
changes in model specifications  lead to considerably  different results.
2.3 Savings and its Derivatives
Another method widely used and tested in Czechoslovakia draws on the concept of
"forced  savings." This concept  is based on the idea that households  are unable to purchase some
goods and services they want because of shortages  in those items, so the only thing they can do
with "excess" money  is put it into savings  accounts.  The presence of "forced" savings would,
therefore, indicate excess demand for goods and services and excess supply of money balances
(savings). The fundamental  question of empirical research is how to recognize  savings or parts
thereof which are "forced."
An approach to identify and measure "forced" savings, suggested by Pindak [1983],
stems from the conjecture that household  savings must be related to another variable such as
income or sales.  Pindak chose three indicators whose movement  could be theoretically  related
to the emergence of suppressed  inflation: the average  propensity to save, the incremental  ratio
of  money holdings, and the  income velocity of  household money holdings." 9 A  similar
approach has been adopted by Winiecki [1985], who proposed another indicator, namely the
ratio of savings to retail sales (See Table IV.) Pindak himself was aware of two fundamental
shortcomings  of his methodology.  First,  it is assumed that no adjustment of official goods
markets  takes place through  parallel markets,  and second,  the indicators  do not take into account
so-caled "forced" substitution. In addition, the savings function must be stable over time and
savings must be determined  only by income.
1The peiod  was covered only by Dlouhy, while Rudlovcak  covered only the period 1971-
1984. Dlouhy's results for the 1980s have been confirmed  by Charemza [19911  who specified
the supply equation by a random walk process with drift.  The findings have pointed to a
permanent excess demand in the 1980s in Czechoslovakia,  but the extent of disequilibrium  is
different in comparison  to that generated by Dlouhy's model.  By and large, these findings  are
consistent  with those of Feltenstein  and Ha (1992), who find only small suppressed  inflation for
the period of the 1980s.
"9For definitions  of these terms, see notes to Table IV in the appendix.
13The concept of "forced" substitution  is particularly relevant in CPEs.  Consumers in
"shortage" economy often compensate  for their inability to purchase a particular product by
buying a substitute.  They are said to be "forced" to acquire another product, and there is no
doubt that "forced" substitution  played its role in equilibrating  the consumer market even in
Czechoslovakia. Thus, the presence of "forced" substitution  will affect the size of ("forced")
savings.
Another assumption, potentially less  important for  Czechoslovakia, concerns the
functioning  of parallel markets.  Following the work of Alexeev and others, 20 some - but by
no means all -- Czechoslovak  economists  argue that parallel markets absorb any excess money
holdings  because prices are free in these markets. It implies that  people can always satisfy their
demand, with only price determining  whether they succeed  in doing so.  Thus, savings can only
be voluntary or speculative;  households  speculate  on finding a better supply  in official markets
where they can purchase items for relatively low prices or on seeing a decline of prices in
parallel markets.  Though this approach is theoretically  attractive, we do not believe that it is
relevant for Czechoslovakia. In the view of many observers, the underground economy in
Czechoslovakia  has never been sufficiently  large, either with respect to commodity or labor
markets.
In  spite of  these  objections, most Czechoslovak economists consider  savings  in
Czechoslovakia  to be mainly voluntary,  with only a small  part "forced." They further  argue that
households' savings decisions are  determined both  by  current economic situation and by
expectations.  That is to  say, attitudes toward savings can shift when rapid economic and
institutional  changes take place.  Thus, a part of savings  always represents  a potential pressure
on the (official) markets. 2"
We decided to carry out a simple test of the theory that savings have, for the most part,
been voluntary.  We applied the approach of Pindak, Winiecki and others and looked at the
changes in various savings-related  indicators. We assumed, of course, that savings were tied
to a macroeconomic  variable through  proxy -- typically  income or retail sales. Bearing in mind
the limitations  mentioned  above, we can look more closely at the dynamics of these indicators
for Czechoslovakia  in 1980s (see Table IV).
The figures refer exclusively  to households' holdings;  we computed three velocities of
money, average propensity to consume, incremental  ratio of money holdings, and savings-to-
sales ratio.  The velocity of cash holdings  (velocity-C)  hovers around the value of 2.50, which
20For the original contributions  see eg. Alexeev [1988] or Acharya, Spagat [1991].
2IThe posit1..  of these Czechoslovak  economists  is different from the position in other
CPEs.  This is in spite of the fact that the dynamics  of savings  behavior  was similar in all CPEs
and one would, therefore, expect similar outcomes.  However, differences may arise due to
institutional  and cultural differences  or other factors.
14means that transactions' demand for money  is relatively  stable. The slightly decreasing  velocity
of total savings (velocity-S)  reflects only falling velocity of non-cash deposits (velocity-NC),
which needs to be explained. On the one hand, this tendency  could be brought  about by higher
speculative  balances but, on the other hand, this may be evidence of some "forced" savings.
The same  tendency  - rising ratio of savings  or of saving  increments  to a macroeconomic  variable
- is confirmed  by alternative  indicators,  such as average  propensity  to save (APSNC)  and savings-
to-sales ratio.
All these indicators  also show relatively  slower  development  in 1988-1989  and unusually
large increases  in 1990. The latter year reflects adverse expectations  of the public concerning
higher purchases  and expenditures  in general. It may be useful to recall the role of expectations:
institutional  and economic  conditions,  and especially  anticipated  changes  in these  conditions,  may
abruptly change the public's attitude to savings.
The question remains how these figures should be interpreted. From Table IV, we can
see a clear trend for households  to put aside more money than they desire, up to 1987. This
means that the households  were "forced" to save. We believe that the forced savings created a
continuing  pressure on the consumer market.  This assumes, of course, that savings functions
are stable over time, as we noted above.  On this assumptio.  , we estimate the forced savings
as the difference  between the actual savings  and those estimated  from the stable savings  function
and found that the share of  "forced" savings was on average about 5 percent throughout the
1980s, which means approximately  Kcs 1.5 billion  per year. If prices were free to adjust during
this period, the release of the "forced"  savings  would  contribute  by not more than 0.3 percentage
point to the CPI.  Furthermore, taldng into account the likely 5 percent share of "forced"
deposits  in aggregate  household  savings, this represents  about 4-5 percentage  points to inflation
after full price liberalization  - a fairly small impact.'
2.4  Conjuncture Test
A unique  attempt  to identify  disequilibrium  in the consumer  market  is the so-called  "trade
conjuncture" test. The test calculates the value of an indicator (imbalance) and is based on
surveys  of salesmen  in which they  are asked  about the degree of demand  satisfaction.  The value
'Our  estimates are very rough: we simply compute hypothetical  savings based on APSNC
from the previous year and the difference between the hypothetical and actual values are
considered as "forced savings.  Adding this amount to retail sales and comparing it with the
actual sales gives an extra 0.3 percent inflation per annum on average.  Similarly, cumulative
"forced" savings are supposed  to be 5 percent, which -placing the sum on the consumer  market
- should induce 4-5 percent inflation.
15of the indicator (imbalance) varies from -100 to  +100;  negative values indicate a negative
evaluation (shortage), positive values indicate excess supply, zero represents an equilibrium.23
The major reservation  to conjuncture  tests is that they do not take into account "forced"
substitution  and the effect of parallel markets, as do the Pindak and Winiecki methods.' The
perceived imbalances  may therefore be relevant in the partial equilibrium  framework but they
need not generate an aggregate disequilibrium.  In other words, the reported values (sec Table
V) are related to the  A  ant  disequilibrium  in specific  markets before some form of adjustment
takes place such as "forced" substitution.
Further, it must be born in mind that the conjuncture  tests are the result of surveys on
expert opinion and  thus are  subject to  the usual problems of  sampling and other  survey
difficulties. On the other hand, they are product-specific  and highly disaggregate. That is to
say, they provide specific  information  about individual  markets. The authors of the test believe
that to the extent that bias exist - either in sampling  methods or in responses - the bias should
be consistent  over time.
The tests have been compiled for many markets, but Tible V shows the division into
foodstuff  and durables only. Rising positive  numbers indicate the perception  of rising surpluses
in shops and vice-versa. The interesting  point is that the conjuncture  tests in the second  half of
the 1980s confirm our conclusions  from the previous section - namely, that there has been
intensive shortage since 1988, reaching a peak in  1990.  From this point of view, we should
concentrate on non-perishable  goods where a sharp worsening of shortage is evident.
2.5  Purchasing Pos~er  Parity (PPP) Estimates
So far  we have been considering direct estimators of inflation, but it  can be also
estimated  indirectly.  One such indirect method is the purchasing power parity technique  that
leads to estimates  of inflation as a by-product  of comparisons  of purchasing  power parties over
time.  The PPP technique  involves  a comparison  of price levels among  countries  by comparing
the purchasing power of currencies, which leads to an implicit  exchange rate of currencies. In
23As far as we know, Czechoslovakia  is the only country which used this kind of indicator.
The investigations  were performed quarterly and covered the whole retail sector; in 1990, the
question about the option of salesmen  on demand satisfaction  was sent only to firms with over
100 employees.  The surveys, which have been conducted by  Vyzkumny ustav obchodu
(Research  Institute of Trade), discontinued  after 1990.
'Recall,  however, that parallel markets were not sufficiently  large in Czechoslovakia  and
that only a small part of the population  participated  in them.  Nonetheless,  two general effects
are possible. First, transactions  in the "second"  economy  require more cash, and second, those
who become better off can buy more luxury goods that would otherwise not be accessible.
16turn, comparisons  of implicit exchange rates of currencies based on PPP lead to estimates of
relative changes in price levels of given countries.
An important  merit of the PPP technique  is that it enables  one to estimate  the differences
in price levels between countries.  This is particularly important for countries in  which the
exchange rate  does not provide meaningful information about the  true scarcity of  foreign
exchange, a problem that was particularly serious in Czechoslovakia  prior to the introduction
of economic  reform in 1990/91. On the other hand, the technique  has a number  of well-known
shortcomings  and limitations. The most serious  are: (1) product coverage is incomplete  and the
analysis is derived from samples;  (2) the information  is subject  to typical  problems  of sampling;
(3) goods and services are not homogenous  among  these countries, and the estimators  must take
into account differences in quality; (4) consumer  preferences may differ among countries and
over time, which leads to the usual index-number  problems; (5) the choice of countries to be
compared may be biased.
Given these shortcomings,  the interpretations  of PPP estimated  are not straightforward.
Nevertheless, the comparison  of estimates is often interpreted in the literature on CPEs as an
indicator of "hidden" price increases.  We can report here a  study of Havlik [1985], who
compared purchasing power parity in Austria and Czechoslovakia. His conclusion was that
purchasing  power parity in 1980 amounted  to 1 AS = 0.52 Kcs. A similar study performed by
the Economic Institute  of the Academy  of Sciences  in Prague in 1967 found PPP 0.70 in 1964.
Comparing  both PPP indices and using CPI in Austria as the base, Havlik obtained  an increase
of price level in Czechoslovakia  during 1964-1980  amounting to  1.69.3 This means that the
average annual inflation in  the given period was 3.3 percent, whereas the Czechoslovak
authorities  admitted  only 1.4 percent. Thus, Havlik states, hidden  inflation  was nearly 2 percent
per annum.
A similar technique  was used by Nachtigal [1990], who compared nominal  and average
r=tail prices.6 The aim of his study was to separate the structural effect of forced substitution,
which was assumed to push up the average prices.  He estimated that this effect brought about
0.2-0.5 percentage point of "true" inflation.  This figure is obviously much less than Havlik
suggested.
Reservations to both Havlik's and Nachtigal's studies are quite obvious.  Among the
problems noted above, the issue of quality adjustments seems particularly  serious.  Both
2 'CPICs =  CPIA  PPP8J/PPP6 = 2.27 * 0.52/0.72 =  1.69
2 The nominal price is the actual price in  the market; the average price is obtained by
dividing nominal retail sales for a given commodity  by the physical amount of sold goods. The
information about physical amounts was available only for some commodities so that this
indicator cannot cover the whole consumer  market.
17estimates  are based on subjective  valuations,  and they depend  on quality coefficients  used in the
studies.  The theoretical  basis of the approach is not entirely clear.
The range of estimated  hidden inflation  is, therefore, quite wide.  The studies show 0.5
percent of hidden inflation as the lowest estimate and 2 percent as the upper boundary during
the 1980s. The true value is probably somewhere in the middle, say 1-1.5 percent.  Clearly,
this is purely a guess, not a figure derived from a rigorous analysis.
2.6  Investment Sector
We have argued above that the investment  sector of the economy  was the major source
of inflation or inflationary  pressures in CPEs.  Some theoretical  arguments for other countries
have been provided, for instance  by Bauer [19781,  Winiecki [19851,  and Podkaminer (19851,
with no empirical backing. We have also argued that the emerging disequilibria  spill partially
into the consumer  market. Unfortunately,  the latter effect has not been analyzed  empiricaUy  and
it is practically impossible to ascertain its importance.  A more theoretical attempt at this by
Klaus [1985] has not proceeded  to empirical  results.
What we have today are only estimates  of disguised  (hidden) inflation  in the investment
sector. Johanovsky  [1987]  states that the prices of machinery  and equipment  (investments)  were
rising on average by 3.5 percent a year faster than the official  index during the last 25-30 years,
and prices in construction  were rising approximately  2 percent faster.  Johanovsky  based his
approach  on a method  know in Czechoslovakia  as "capacity  equivalent." This compares  a given
capital equipment  over time and estimates the productivity  improvements. These productivity
improvements are  then compared with the official price of this technology.  Specifically,
Johanovsky took prices of the same products in the  1950s and the 1980s, then considered
differences  in the quality (capacity), which he compared with the official price indices.
A similar expert analysis was performed by Svoboda (1989] who compared technical
parameters of 4,000 investments  and their prices in various periods.  He obtained nearly the
same results as Johanovsky.  A substantially  higher hidden price increase was estimated by
Johanovsky for investments where the heterogenous nature of supplies enabled investors to
increase prices; central planners could regulate those prices only with difficulty. The estimate
of the price increase in this case ranges between 6 and 7 percent.
A different  approach, but with similar results, was chosen by Kolanda [1988]. He based
his estimates  on export prices of investment  goods. His results more or less coincide  with those
of  Johanovsky.27  All  these estimates generated by  expert studies  suffer from a  major
drawback: they touch upon only a part of the sector, only some segments. Their coverage is,
' 7Estimates  of  these experts were reviewed by Nachtigal (1990] who reconciled minor
differences and estimated  the corresponding  deflators  of output.
18therefore,  incomplete  and the estimates  are not relevant  for the investment  sector  as a whole.
More importantly,  they assume  that productivity  gains  must be reflected  in lower prices  - an
assumption  that quite clearly  has no theoretical  validity  in the behavior  of economic  agents  in
the short-run. Nevertheless,  the interesting  feature  of all the above,  independent,  estimates  is
that they point to the same  direction  and roughly  to the same  figures. In sum, these figures
suggest  that  prices  in industry  were  rising  by 3-3.5  percent  and in construction  by 1.5-2  percent
per annum  faster  than officially  reported.
3.  Prices in the Transition Period 1990-1991
3.1  Preliminary Steps in 1990 and the Impact on Ikflation
The evolution of events in  1990-1991  differs completely from the development  in the
second half of the 1980s, described  above. The new government,  established  at the end of 1989
and confirmed  by the election in 1990, started the transition  to a market economy  in early 1992.
In  addition,  the economy experienced severe exogenous shocks, mainly the  break-up of
COMECON  and the economic  collapse  of the Soviet Union. The impact  of these, however, did
not show  up fully until 1991. At the same time,  1990  was a year of discussions  and preparations
for reform -- a period of preliminary steps rather than one of complete  reform.  The relevant
preliminary steps included removal of retail subsidies and currency devaluations.  The basic
question  in connection  with inflation  is, therefore,  what  fueled  price increases  in the course  of
1990 and 1991.
In 1990, the average  annual rate of inflation was 10 percent for the economy  as a whole,
with foodstuffs  growing at a rate of 11.1 percent, durables by 10.5 percent, catering service by
8.5 percent,  and other services  by 7.4 percent  (month-by-month  increases  are shown  in Table
II).  Since price control was still exercised in 1990, the question  arises as to what caused these
increases.
A major contribution  to inflation in 1990 was the administrative  changes  in retail prices
due to abolition of subsidies.  Retail prices has been highly subsidized  in the past through the
so-called  negative  turnover tax (Kcs  28 billion  in 1989). The subsidies  were removed to a large
extent in July 1990, causing a jump in price levels. 28 The action had a major impact on the
price of foodstuffs,  causing  an increase of 24.2 percent or 3.5 points of average inflation  on an
28The total effect was determined not only by those Kcs 28 billion, but additional Kcs 5
billion, which were due to adjustments  in retail margins.
19annual  basis. 29 Other  items,  such  as  oil  products,  newspapers,  cigarettes,  tariffs  in
transportation, etc. contributed 3.7 percentage points of inflation.  Thus, the administrative
changes are estimated to have increased the average price level by 7.2 percent.
Intensive  hoarding at the end of 1990  also helped  push prices up - by 18.4  percent in the
last quarter.  In anticipation  of the "big bang" and the price liberalization  scheduled  for January
1991, the public acceleraed its spending. These inflationary  expectations  would have led to a
demand-pull  in a standard market environment,  but the Czechoslovak  economy  was still under
price controls.  Nevertheless,  the demand pressures soaked through to prices.  This happened
through  changes in the goods supplied  to markets, as firms reduced the supply of lower quality,
lower priced items and moved to  higher price categories.  According to  some unofficial
estimates, this led to an additional 1.1 percent increase in the price level.  That increase has
been concentrated  in textiles  and leather goods, but we suspect that this source of inflation was
present in other areas as well.  It is impossible,  however, to separate  this effect from the impact
resulting from the removal  of subsidies,  which  was dominant. Thus, the figure mentioned  above
(7.2 percent) is likely to include this inflationary  factor.
The Price Bureau  attributes  the remaining  1.7 points of inflation  to "prices by agreement"
and changes in  statistical methodology.  However, the explanation could also lie in another
factor - devaluations  of the currency. There were three devaluations  in the course of 1990 - in
January, October and December.  It is obvious that the December  devaluation  could not have
had any impact on the price level in  1990 due to  the time lag required for the effects of
devaluation  to work through the domestic price system. The effect of the October devaluation
was,  we believe, only negligible for the  same reason.  On the  other hand, the January
devaluation  could, and we believe  did, influence  the price level; it could hardly have any impact
on the prices charged by domestic firms because they were controlled , but prices of imported
consumer  goods are likely to have contributed  to a higher  price level. The crown was devalued
by 15 percent and the share of imported  goods in the consumer  market was 10-15  percent; we,
therefore, estimate that the January devaluation might have been responsible for all of  the
remaining 1.7 percent noted above.
Generally  speaking, 1990  was characterized  by first steps to liberalize  prices and thus to
release inflationary  pressures - by removing subsidies  and devaluations. Nevertheless,  due to
the institutional and economyiic  continuation  of price controls, suppressed and mainly hidden
inflation still survived.  It changed dramatically  at the beginning  of 1991.
29Source:  Bureau  for Prices, Federal Ministry  of Finance, mimeo. The computations  of the
individual figures are  based on CPIs of individual items supplied by the Federal Statistical
Office. We can also check the figures indirectly. For instance, the price increase  in foodstuffs
can be verified as follows. The foodstuffs  subsidies  were approximately  Kcs 30 billion, nominal
retail sales of foodstuffs  Kcs 160 billion; the ratio of nominal to hypothetical  real retail sales
indicates a price increase of 23 percent (=160/130).
203.2  Price Liberalization of 1991
Several Czechoslovak  economists  have observed  that Czechoslovak  consumers  generally
show an extremely high propensity to consume in times of recession and times of pronounced
shortages  of consumer  goods (through  "forced"  substitutions). Such consumer  behavior  reflected
the fact that those periods also were always characterized by increased inflation - open or
hidden.  Consequently, the propensity to  save  declined.  This  type of  behavior differs
significantly  from usual consumer behavior  in a market economy  where the propensity  to save
usually grows in times of recession, as households  are trying to cope with growing uncertainty
about their future incomes.
The inflationary  pattern in the course of 1991  was quite remarkable. As Table Im  shows,
the immediate  impact  of price liberalization  in 1991  was a big jump in the price level in January
(CPI increased  by 25.8 percent). Following  the strict fiscal and monetary  policies, inflation  very
quickly was brought under control.  The rate of  inflation started to  fall in February and
continued to decline until July, when no price increase was registered.  Inflation essentially
disappeared  in the second half of the year until November  and December, when it rose slightly
as a  result of further removal  f price subsidies, government financing of  market support
programs for certain commodities (the so-called "fund of market regulation"), sales of new
higher-priced  agricultural  products, and Christmas  shopping. The pattern was very similar, not
surprisingly,  in ihe case of producer prices.
The high propensity  to hoard under the inflationary  expectations,  particularly  in Slovakia,
where the process of economic  reform faced greater resistance of the public, characterized  the
beginning of 1991, and was a big factor behind the initial price jump.  The slow reaction of
domestic enterprises to re-price their products in  the market was also cited as a reason for
increased  demand. Another  important  factor in the shift of prices was the monopolized  structure
of the Czechoslovak  economy.  Sujan [1992] suggested  that the lack of competition  added 24
percentage  points to the annual  inflation, which  reached  57.8 percent; other factors were internal
imbalances (9 points), the increase in import prices due to the break-up of COMECON (6
points), and the effect of devaluations  (15 points). 30
The slowdown of  inflation can be explained by  several factors, namely restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies, anchoring the exchange rate, wage regulations, 31 and a change
in spending (savings) habits.  The last factor is worth discussing.  People stopped hoarding
30Sujan's findings have different interpretations.  It appears that he compares two time
periods in  the framework of comparative statistics rather than in  a dynamic framework of
inflationary proc  ess.  His results could therefore be better interpreted as a price adjustment
between two periods.
3 "The wage-inflation  issue is discussed  in Sujan [1992b].
21goods, because they started to believe in a successful  stabilization 32, and because their behavior
became "standard", that is to say, they were coping with uncertainty  about the future through
saving (see Table VI).  Thus, in  spite of their situation, families refrained from immediate
consumption  and began to rebuild their financial  balances.  The households' behavior became
much more influenced  by long-term  planning.
This behavior  as a response to insecurity exhibited  many characteristics  of a "classical"
consumer -- namely diversification  of economic activities that secure financial means for the
household, and spreading  the risks posed by a deteriorating  economic situation.
At the same time, this type of consumer  behavior helped to tame inflation; inflationary
expectations  have gone down after the original outburst following the liberalization  of prices.
Stabilization  policy brought a positive effect, succeeding  quickly in bringing inflation down to
a very low one-digit level.
A peculiar and not fully explained featur_ in Czechoslovakia  is the different rates of
inflation  in the Czech and Slovak  parts of the country. This suggests  a certain structural  rigidity
in the economy. The Slovakian  inflation  rate exceeded  by 4.6 percentage points.  We see three
likely reasons for the difference: Once again expectations  played a role.  The population  in the
Czech lands seemed to believe in the govemment's reform commitments  more than Slovak did,
so the anticipated  inflation  is higher in Slovakia. Secondly,  Slovakia  imposed "softer" policies,
which justify those adverse expectations.  And finally, industry is presumably even more
monopolized  in Slovakia  than in the Czech lands, because Slovakia  is more open to lobbying.
Most importantly,  the absence of an adjustment  mechanism  that would produce forces to offset
the impact of these factors is presumably  the major impediment  for more effective  conduct of
macroeconomic  policies.
4.  Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to assess the extent of inflation in Czechoslovakia  during
the period 1985-1991  and identify  the likely causes of inflation. It was argued that the official
price indices fail to capture the full extent of disequilibrium. What is missing  in the official
indices such as CPI is "hidden inflation" -- the practices that disguise price increases behind
"cosmetic"  or other changes in product quality. Moreover, official  prices were never perceived
by central planners to be fully market-clearing,  and the overall price level would, therefore,
correspond  to the level associated  with general equilibrium  only by coincidence. An attempt was
made in this paper to evaluate the empirical results of disequilibrium  models to measure the
degree of suppressed  inflation.
32The role of monetary and fiscal policies is analyzed  in Tuma [1992].
22It was further argued that inflationary pressures in  the period 1985-1989 originated
mainly  in the investment  sector. Traditionally,  it was the consumer  sector where most observers
would seek the emergence of inflationary  pressures in view of its institutional  characteristics.
Our argument is different.  Even though the investment sector was strictly controlled and the
emergence of open inflation was extremely  difficult, the scope for inflationary  pressures was
wide.  The pressures themselves arose from a mixture of factors - poor investment planning
(micro and macro) and high priority given to investments  and social consumption.
The discussion of official price indices was focused  on the consumer  price index as a
leading  proxy of inflation measurement  and producer prices. Various sensitivity  tests performed
by the Federal Statistical Office have revealed that official price indices were not significantly
affected by the statistical methodology  adopted in their construction. The hypothesis  of hidden
and suppressed inflation had been addressed through a number of approaches.  Econometric
models in the disequilibrium  framework, aiming to specify the extent of excess demand, are
heavily dependent  on the model specifications  and are also difficult to interpret.  The favorite
indicator of suppressed inflation has been the savings variable.  Several variants of this have
been computed for the 1980s, and they indicate the presence  of some "forced" savings, albeit
not substantial. This important  conclusion  is in line with other tests of suppressed  inflation  such
as the conjuncture  tests.
Estimates of hidden  inflation are also identified  and reviewed. While there is a general
agreement  about the presence  of hidden  inflations  in the period 1985-1989,  there is no consensus
about the rate.  Estimates  range from 0.5 percent to 2 percent in the consumer  market and about
3 percent in industry.  The different ranges of inflation in the consumer and producer sectors
were not atypical in CPEs, in view of the market segmentation  noted above.
The most remarkable  feature of all the inflation indicators is the relatively low level of
inflation  in Czechoslovakia,  in comparison  to most CPEs.  We believe that this reflects a better
macroeconomic  policy.  This relatively favorable  development  had important  consequences  for
the introduction  of price liberalization  in 1990  and 1991, because prices were liberalized  in the
presence of a relatively smaller inflationary  gap.
The price liberalization  of  1990 and 1991 did indeed lead to acceleration  of inflation
throughout 1990  and to substantial  increase in the price level in January 1991. Since then, the
rate of inflation has been slowing  down and has stabilized  at less than 1  percent per month. This
paper identifies major causes of inflation escalation (inflationary gap, removal of subsidies,
devaluations  and expectations)  as well as the reasons behind the recent progress in controlling
inflation.
As is common, empirical studies of this kdnd have a number of shortcomings.  The
authors are well aware of many problenm;  pertaining  to computations  of various inflation
23indicators,  as well as to interpretations  of the results. Clearly, all the estimates  reviewed  in this
study must be viewed with great caution. Nevertheless,  we believe that these problems  do not
fundamentally  alter our basic conclusion - that inflation in Czechuslovalda  remained  relatively
under control, although official data do not sufficiently  capture the extent off  macroeconomic
disequilibrium.
24Table I  Official price indices, 1980-1991
||  ~~1980  |1981  |1982  1p983  |1984  |1985  |1986  |1987  |198'8  |19899  |  1990  |1991
CPI'  2.9  0.8  5.1  0.9  0.5  2.7  0.5  0.1  0.2  1.4  10.0  57.9
-foodstuffs  0.2  0.0  9.4  0.6  -0.2  3.6  1.3  0.2  -0.3  0.1  11.1  45.3
-durables  4.4  1.5  1.5  1.1  1.2  0.7  0.7  0.2  0.3  2.6  10.5  72.0
-catering  0.0  0.0  14.1  0.6  -1.4  -3.2  0.5  0.0  0.6  1.0  8.5  57.0
-services  6.5  0.7  0.4  1.1  1.6  -0.3  0.1  -0. 1  0.9  0.8  7.4  39.5
ppII  '_1__=_
-industry  1.9  4.8  7.6  -u.3  8.2  1.6  0.0  0.1  0.0  -0.7  4.5  69.9
-cnsiruc(n.  0.0  0.0  8.9  0.0  13.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -2.3  6.5  48.7
-investment  0.1  0.4  6.9  0.8  8.5  -0.1  0.2  -0.4  0.3  -1.6  3.9  n.a.
- machns  0.3  1.0  3.1  2.0  0.6  -0.3  0.6  -1.0  0.7  -3.6  0.5  n.a.
-agricultr.  8.4  1.2  9.1  0.4  3.2  0.1  0.7  0.3  -0.2  27.0  3.9  6.8
NMP deflator2  1.88  1.76  1.14  1.15  1.42  1.99  1.36  1.42  1.38
GDP deflator  _____  1.13  1.60
Source:  Federal  Statistica  Oficeand  autbors'  computafiorns  -- ___  ___-___  ___
* CPI =  consumer price index; PPI = producer price index
1980 - 1985: computed  using weights of year 1977, and 1967  for PPI respectively
1986 - 1990: computed  using weights of year 1984
2 Both  deflators are computed  on the base of 1984 (until 1984, the base year is 1977).  This is presumably  the reason of some inconsistencies  amng  indices: typically,
the deflator should be between the values of CPI and PPI.Table II  Official  price indeces,  1990, quarterly  data (to the same period of previous  year)
[l______________  I  II  I  III  IV  Average
CPI  3.4  3.9  14.1  18.4  10.0
of which  ._.
foodstuff  0.0  0.2  20.0  24.2  11.1
durables  6.8  7.4  11.0  16.7  10.5
catering  0.2  1.3  15.9  116.2  8.5
services  3.3  3.7  9.9  12.7  7.4  ||
PPI  industry  1.3  1.4  1.5  17.8  5.5
GDP  deflator  1.07  1.09  1.14  I  1.20  1.13
Source: Federal Statistical  Office
*  1.1.1984=  100Table  III  Official price indices, 1991, month-on-month  changes
Jan  IFeb  ar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  |Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec
|CPI  25.8  17.0  14.7  2.0  11.9  |1.8  -0.1  [0  10.3  1-0.1  1.6  1.2
of which:
- foodstuffs  31.4  1.0  -2.2  -1.6  -0.5  -0.1  0.4  -0.1  0.8  -0.1  3.5  2.9
- durables  23.0  13.9  11.4  3.9  3.5  0.5  -0.6  -0.1  0  -0.5  0.3  0.5
- catering  43.7  1.8  -1.0  -0.1  -0.3  0.9  0.5  -0.3  -0.2  -0.5  0  1.1
services  8.6  3.6  1.5  4.8  4.2  12.8  0.6  0.4  0.5  2.5  3.6  0.6
PPI
- industry  24.0  19.3 [0.1  2.9  1.7  -0.8 I0.5 0.4  1-0.4  0  0.9  |  0.6
- constructn:
- work  33.1  8.  3  1.7*| 0.8n |  2.2*  0.3*| 1.3  -0.3  -02  0.6 10.2  0
- material  42.6  10.4  1.8  1.1  j3.3  0.3  J  -0.3  -0.3  _-0.4  0.1  0.3  0 I-  agricultr.  - 2.7  11.3  1-0.6 -1.8 12.9  1-0.7  10.4  1-3.8  11.5 111.7  11.2
GDP deflator,  1991 - quarterly data
I  II  III  IV  1991
GDP deflator  1.52  1.52  1.63  1,73  1.60
Source: Federal Statistical Office and authors' computation
)estimateTable IV  Monetary indicators, 1980-1991
T  M icto  19801  1981  1982  1983  1984 (  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Disp. inc.  YD  315.90  323.60  338.20  348.40  360.00  372.40  383.70  396.50  413.10  426.80  461.70
Cash  C  121.90  125.80  133.10  139.60  144.70  147.80  153.10  158.30  163.60  170.30  172.30
- change  dC  3.90  7.30  6.50  5.10  3.10  5.30  5.20  5.30  6.70  2.00
Non-cash  NC  73.00  80.20  88.40  98.10  109.00  120.80  134.00  148.20  160.80  171.90  177.20
- change  dNC  7.20  8.20  9.70  10.90  11.80  13.20  14.20  12.60  11.10  5.30
Total svngs  S  194.90  206.00  221.50  237.70  253.70  268.60  287.10  306.50  324.40  342.20  349.50
-change  dS  11.10  15.50  16.20  16.00  14.90  18.50  19.40  17.90  17.80  7.30
Retail  RS  255.10  261.00  268.50  276.90  285.00  296.40  304.70  313.70  329.00  340.50  381.20
Velocity-C  V=YD/C  2.59  2.57  2.54  2.50  2.49  2.52  2.51  2.50  2.53  2.51  2.68
Velocity-S  V=YD/S  1.62  1.57  1.53  1.47  1.42  1.39  1.34  1.29  1.27  1.25  1.32
Velocity-NC  V=YDINC  4.33  4.03  3.83  3.55  3.30  3.08  2.86  2.68  2.57  2.48  2.61
APSs=dS*I00IYD  3.43  4.58  4.65  4.44  4.00  4.82  4.89  4.33  4.17  1.58
R=dC*100/YD  1.21  2.16  1.87  1.42  0.83  1.38  1.31  1.28  1.57  0.43
S/RS  0.76  0.79  0.82  0.86  0.89  0.91  0.94  0.98  0.99  1.00  0.92
APSNc=,(dNCIYD) *  100  2.22  2.42  2.78  3.03  3.17  3.44  3.58  3.05  2.60  1.15
Source: Monetary Surveys of SBCs; Czechoslovak  statistics; authors' computations
Note (all figures refer to households' holdings):
C (cash) =  currency + demand  deposits
NC (non-cash) =  time deposits +  foreign currency deposits
S (total savings) - C + NC
RS =  retil  sales
R =  incremental  ratio of moneyTable V  Conjuncture tests, 1980-1990
_  1980  11981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  198Rt  1989  1990
Aggregate  saldo  -12.2  -12.1  1. 13.2  [ -3.3  |  -0.2  |  0.4  |  -2.7  |  -8.7  -15-6  |  -14,7  |  -20.8
of which:
-foodstuffs  -7.1  -9.3  -13.5  4.2  10.1  10.4  10.4  3.0  -2.3  -1.2  -3.2
-durables  -16.6  -14.5  -12.9  -10.0  -9.4  -8.6  -12.1  -17.2  -25.1  -24.5  -36.7
Source:  Vfzkumny dstav obchodu
Table VI  Households' deposits in 1991
|  || l2E~IIIIIan  Feb  IMar  | Apr  IMay  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  |Oct  Nov  Doc
Demand  dep.  100.1  96.3  95.7  93.4  92.9  92.0  92.6  91.4  91.4  91.6  91.6  92.0
Time dep.  159.4  168.5  171.3  175.4  178.3  180.1  183.7  184.6  186.1  187.4  189.3  214.3
Foreign cur.  dep.  10.5  11.8  13.5  15.2  16.9  18.1  119.6  21.6  22.4  | 23.2  |  l
Sorce:  Monetary  surveys  of the State Czechoslvak  Bank  ___  -________  ___ References
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